THE ADOPTION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES:  AN ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY by Kauffman, Robert J. et al.
THE ADOPTION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES: 
AN ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Robert J. Kauffman 
Stern School of Business 
New York University 
James McAndrews 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Yu-Ming Wang 
Stern School of Business 
New York University 
Workinq PaDer Series 
STERN IS-93-26 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93-26 
The Adoption of Interorganizational Systems and Network Externalities: 
An Analytical and Empirical Study 
September 1993 
Robert J. Kauffnlan' 
Associate Professor of Information Systems 
Stern School of Business 
New York University 
James McAndrews 
Senior Economist 
Department of Research 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Yu-Ming Wang 
Doctoral Program in Information Systems 
Stern School of Business 
New York University 
'The authors wish to thank Dick Yanak, President, and Dick Syrnington, Vice President, New 
England Network 1nc.Nankee 24, for access to data, managers' time and network member 
firms. We also thank 3ouglas Robertson for excellent research assistance. Rob  Kauffman 
acknowledges partial support for data collection from the Nippon Electric Corporation, and 
the US.-Japan Business and Economics Research Center of the Stern School of Business, 
New York University. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia o r  of the Federal 
Reserve System, or of Yankee 24 and its management. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-93-26 
The Adoption of Interorganizational Systems and Network Externalities: 
An Analytical and Empirical Study 
ABSTRACT 
Recent work in the information systems literature has argued that network 
externalities, the value of a network created as a by-product of an existing installed base, are 
a determinant of interorganizational systems (10%) adoption. However, almost no 
empirical studies have reported the impact of network externalities on the adoption of IOSs. 
As a result, little is known about the extent to which network externalities may influence the 
adoption and diffusion of 10%. Using electronic banking as a context, an analytical 
framework is developed to model the business value of a shared network to a bank that is 
considering whether to become involved. We show that network externalities, prolried by 
expected shared network size, as well as the size of banking firms, are major elements of the 
perceived value of the network. To empirically assess the impact of these elements on the 
timing of network adoption and validate our analytical model, we estimate a hazard model 
(also known as duration or failure time model) using the adoption data for Yankee 24, the 
largest shared electronic banking network in New England. The hazard model approach 
that explicitly incorporates covariates in the specification of time to adopt is employed to 
accommodate right-ce?zsoriitg of our observations of adoption times. We find that banks in 
markets that can generate a larger effective network size and have more depositors served 
per branch tend to adopt early, while the size of a bank's own branch network decreases the 
probability of early adoption. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rate at which technologies are adopted by firms is a fundamental aspect of the 
process of technological change. Accordingly, investigation of the firm-specific and market- 
specific characteristics which influence decisions to adopt technologies has long been 
recognized as an important area of study. With the advent of mudern telecommunications 
capabilities, a particularly interesting technology, interorganizational systems (IOSs), is 
rapidly becoming a competitive necessity in a wide variety of industries. 
IOSs are automated information systems shared by two or more companies (Cash and 
Konsynski, 1985). Several studies report on successful applications of IOSs, including 
regionally shared electronic banking networks in the middle Atlantic United States (Banker 
and Kauffman, 1990; Clemons, 1990), the CIRRUS and PLUS nationally shared electronic 
banking networks (Kauffman and Wang, 1992), airline computerized reservation systems 
(CRS) (Copeland and McKenney, 1988), and wholesale distribution systems (Clemons and 
Row, 1988). Other well known IOSs include credit card switching and transaction 
confirmation systems (Steiner and Teixeira, 1990), and the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) that has traditionally provided telecommunications 
links between international commercial banks to permit the exchange of payment 
information. Keen (1991) suggests that firms not able to adopt IOSs in time may be locked 
out of a wide range of services and the market. 
Like telephone networks, IOSs are subject to significant i z e ~ o r k  extenzalities in that 
the value of an IOS to a given subscriber is affected by the number of others joining the 
same network. The literature suggests that network externalities have a number of strategic 
implications for technology adoption and yields a conclusion that technologies subject to 
network externalities have characteristics not shared by many other traditional technological 
innovations {Cabral, 1990; Dybvig and Spatt, 1983; Farrell and Saloner, 1985 and 19%; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985, 1986a and 1986b; Oren and Smith, 1981; Rohlfs, 1974). In the 
information systems (IS) literature, there have been some theoretical analyses or frameworks 
to guide the study of IOSs (e.g., Bakos, 1991; Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Johnston and 
Vitale, 1988; Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987). However, there has been little empirical 
research on the determinants of IOS adoption, and almost no empirical studies have 
repc.~red the impact of network externalities on the adoption of IOSs. As a result, little is 
known about the extent to which network externalities and other factors may influence the 
adoption and diffusion of IOSs. 
This paper first develops an analytical model to examine the impact of key variables 
influencing the perceived network business value in the context of a shared electronic 
banking network,'a subset of IOSs that exhibited rapid growth throughout the U.S. in the 
1980s. Network externalities in this context are significant because the participation of new 
member banks not only brings in additional automated teller machines (AT3Ms) that can 
enhance locational convenience and service coverage for depositors of existing members, but 
also more card holders that enable additional i~zterchaizge revenues -- access fees earned by 
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a bank if the card holders of other member banks access their accounts using the bank's 
ATMs. Thus, the value of a shared network to depositors as well as member banks 
increases as the network grows. 
We model the perceived business value of a shared network to a potential adopting 
bank in terms of the benefits and costs of adoption. We proxy network externalities using 
the expected shared network size and show that demand side network externalities 
contribute positively to the perceived network business value. In addition, the number of 
depositors served per network ATM location is shown to have a positive impact on network 
value, while the effect of the number of depositors and ATMs on a bank is ambiguous. 
To gauge the extent of network externalities and test the impact of various other 
factors on network adoption decisions, we examine the adoption and diffusion of Yankee 
24, the largest regionally shared network in the northeast region of the U.S. Because 
Yankee 24 started in Connecticut in 1984 and banks in other New England states were 
allowed to join the network only after 1987, we include only Connecticut-based banks in our 
sample. Although we are limited in our ability to generalize on the basis of the results 
obtained in the study of a single network, our choice has two advantages. First, examining 
the adoption of a single technology in a single industry avoids the difficulties encountered 
in previous research in controlling for differences across innovations in capital costs or 
potential profitability (Rose and Joskow, 1990). Second, because the founding members of 
Yankee 24 were a significant group of banks in Connecticut, no other networks were likely 
to enter the market and thus our sample had little uncertainty regarding the ultimate success 
of Yankee 24. This unique aspect of Yankee 24 allows us to focus on the determinants of 
high level externalities rather than on the question of the success of Yankee 24. 
We employ a hazard model (also known as duration or failure time model) approach 
which addresses a series of assumptions and modeling concerns that made subsequent 
empirical analysis possible and overcomes some of the limitations of previous work on 
technology adoption using cross-sectional models. We specify a hazard model that explicitly 
incorporates explanatory variables in the specification of banks' probabilities to adopt. The 
model is estimated using a data set that includes the adoption dates, a proxy for network 
externalities, banking firm characteristics, and market structure variables. We find that 
banks in markets that are expected to have a larger effective network size and have more 
depositors served per branch tend to adopt early. The number of a bank's depositors also 
contributes to early adoption, while the size of a bank's own branch network decreases the 
probability of network adoption. The results indicate that network externalities play an 
important role in determining the timing of network membership. 
2. NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND SHARED NETWORK VALUATION 
In this section, we review relevant literature and develop an analytical model that 
represents the decision problem faced by a potential adopting bank when it evaluates the 
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perceived business value of a shared electronic banking network. We assume that a bank's 
decision to participate in a shared electronic banking network is a rational economic 
decision, which reflects the present and future benefit and cost flows associated with network 
adoption. The analytical model yields a number of implications and hypotheses to guide an 
empirical test that we will discuss in Sections 3 and 4. 
2.1. Network Externalities as a Determinant of Shared Network Adoption 
First recognized in the context of communications networks, the concept of positive 
network consumption externalities is based on the observation that the value of a network 
to a subscriber increases with the number of adopters of the network. Accordingly, the 
demand for network membership depends on the size of the network, and as the network 
grows, it becomes more attractive to non-subscribers, inducing some of them to join the 
network. Farrell and Saloner (1986) present models that yield the following conclusions: 
because of economies of scale and positive externalities, network goods have a greater 
tendency towards monopoly (or greater concentration) than services that do not generate 
externalities; the strength of the network externalities created as a by-product of an existing 
installed base may lead to a balulwagoiz eflect and result in choices of inferior network 
technologies. In addition, they show that the existence of network externalities has strategic 
implications for a variety of important economic activities, including technology adoption, 
predatory pricing, and product preannouncements. 
Katz and Shapiro (1986a) argue that, because of scale economies and network 
externalities, the dynamics of network goods are fundamentally different from those of 
conventional innovations. In the presence of network externalities, the total benefits derived 
from the network depends, in part, on the number of consumers who adopt compatible 
products in the future. Thus, a consumer in the market today also cares about the future 
success of the products. Tirole (1988) also suggests that firms must anticipate which 
technology will be widely used by others since they are afraid of being stranded if another 
network becomes the standard. In some cases, however, there may be benefits to early 
adoption of what later becomes an industry-wide standard -- the first-mover advantage. This 
line of theoretical research suggests that network externalities have economic value and 
strategic impacts on the structure of markets, industries, and organizations. Network 
externalities, hence, should be a major element in the valuation of network goods. 
In the financial services industry, shared electronic banking networks generate 
significant network business value externalities. As new member banks join the network and 
bring in ATMs, depositors of all existing member banks value more highly their ATM cards 
and would pay a certain share of their network privileges because of more convenient 
locations for account access. In addition, participation of new member banks brings to the 
network more card holders that may access their accounts using the ATMs of existing 
members, and thus increases the potential for some deployers of ATMs to earn more 
interchange revenues. As a result, banks value the shared network more highly as it grows, 
and late entrants at some point in time find that they must join the network in order to 
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avoid competitive disadvantage. 
2.2. Analytical Framework for Shared Electronic Banking Network Valuation 
Saloner and Shepard (1991) employ an econometric model to test the impact of 
explanatory variables on the timing of ATM adoption among banking firms in the U.S. They 
find that a bank's date of adoption is earlier the larger the number of its branches (a proxy 
for the proprietary network benefits to the bank in adopting ATM) and the larger the value 
of its deposits base (a proxy for the number of users). Because there was little sharing of 
ATMs at the time of their study, the focus of their study was the benefits of ATM adoption 
in the presence of network effects in the proprietary ATM networks. The analytical 
framework they developed, however, can be extended to model the value of a shared 
network for considering a bank's adoption decision. Specifically, the model of technology 
adoption they present gives rise to a network effect, but each bank's network benefits are 
independent of other banks' actions. In other words, the adoption decisions were self- 
contained, and no network externalities were involved. In the context of shared electronic 
banking network, a bank must evaluate the expected adoption behavior of other banks. 
2.2.1. The Benefit Dimensions 
McAndrews and Kauffman (1993) model the perceived business value of a shared 
electronic banking network to a bank's depositors per period as a+b(N), where a represents 
the "stand-alone" or "network independent" benefit from the ATM technology and b(N) 
represents the network externalities effect. Note that b(N) monotonically increases in the 
size of the network, N, which represents the number of locations from which a depositor is 
able to access his or her account. In our context, N is the unique equilibrium number of 
participating banks in Connecticut given the sure viability of Yankee 24, and is known to all 
potential members in our sample because the equilibrium adoption of Yankee 24 
membership was foreseen. We assume that the per period increase in revenues to the bank 
is proportional to the per period value to the depositors, and let the parameter X < 1 
denote the proportion. Then, the bank's per period revenues can be formulated as in 
Equation 1, where n is the number of the bank's depositors. For simplicity, we will assume 
that A, remains constant throughout the study period and that it is known to a bank's 
managers. 
We extend the above formulation to incorporate the impact of time varying network 
externalities on interchange revenues that was. significant in the context of shared networks. 
Because banks in our sample were able to observe a group of banks in their market that 
founded and adopted Yankee 24 in Connecticut and there was no significant statewide * 
competition with Yankee 24, they could foresee that Yankee 24 would be a viable and 
successful venture. Hence, there was little uncertainty regarding the desirability of Yankee 
24 membership. 
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To facilitate the discussion and analysis of the increase in revenues associated with 
network adoption in the remaining section, we define three types of ATM transactions. 
Us-on-us refers to the use of a bank's ATM by its card holders. Others-on-as refers to the 
use of a bank's ATM by card holders from another bank. Us-on-others refers to the use by 
a bank's card holders of another bank's ATM. Of these three types of transactions, the f i s t  
two give rise to  benefits and the last one gives rise to a cost. Us-on-us provides a bank's 
ATM service benefit for which customers are willing to pay. Us-on-others and others-on-us 
require interchange. For each interchange transaction, an interchange fee is paid to the 
owner of an ATM by a network member whenever that member's card holders use an ATM. 
Thus, us-on-others requires a bank to pay out on transactions that other banks service for 
its customers, while others-on-us enables it to earn interchange revenues. 
Because the participation of other member banks brings in additional ATMs that can 
enhance the locational convenience and service coverage for depositors, adopting a shared 
electronic banking network creates an us-on-us benefit. Let ni represent the number of 
depositors of bank i, and N, the installed base of the shared network at time t. The present 
value of bank i's decision to adopt a shared network due to the network effect, evaluated 
at  time t=O, is expressed in Equation 2. A, < 1 denotes the proportion of the per period 
value to the depositors that a bank can capture. 6 < 1 is the discount factor. 
By adopting a shared network, banks have opportunities to obtain additional benefits 
through interchange revenues, when other banks' customers' ATM transactions are captured. 
Because the more banks in the shared network, the greater the number of card holders are 
available that are likely to initiate others-on-us transactions and thus contribute to the 
benefit, we express the present value of bank i's interchange revenues earned through 
network membership in Equation 3. 
In this expression, n, is the total number of card holders that can access the shared network 
a t  time t. Ni is the number of ATMs that bank i has deployed. NJNT represents the 
likelihood that bank i's ATMs will be used by other banks' card holders. n,-ni is the number 
of card holders that may initiate others-on-us transactions, f, represents a permissible fee 
schedule, and p1 represents the proportion of those card holders that will do so. For 
simplicity, we will assume Ni, ni, p,, f, and A, are predetermined and fixed over the study 
period. These reflect pieces of information that should be available to bank managers either 
through market research, forecasts or directly from the electronic banking network. 
As more ATM locations become available, the depositors of a bank are also likely 
to  access their bank accounts using the ATMs of other competing banks. Because the 
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competitor is able to charge interchange revenues, in the absence of a policy to pass these 
costs onto a bank's customers, they must be absorbed as a cost of network participation. 
As a result, bankers often talk about "favorable" and "unfavorable" interchange ratios: in 
order to generate net revenues, others-on-us transactions must exceed us-on-others. Thus, 
we also include in our model a term to reflect this reduction to network interchange 
revenues, expressed as Equation 4. 
In this expression, f, is a parameter that reflects the transaction fees earned by the bank's 
competitors for us-on-others interchange, which results in a direct mst to the bank. p2 
denotes the proportion of the bank's card holders that will initiate such transactions. Similar 
to our earlier assumptions with respect to model parameters, we again presume f2 and p2 
to be predetermined and fixed over the study period. The negative sign that precedes 
Equation 4 reflects that this is a revenue benefit that accrues to a competitor, resulting in 
a cost for the potential network adopter. Taken together, Equations 3 and Equation 4 
reflect the net interchange benefits. As expected, the net interchange benefits are greater, 
the larger the values for n, and Ni, and the smaller the values for N, and ni. Taking into 
account the benefit due to the network effect expressed in Equation 2, Equation 5 
represents the total benefits associated with network adoption, which is equal to the sum of 
Equation 2, 3, and 4. Only Ni and n,, however, have an unambiguous and positive impact 
on the benefit side of shared network adoption. 
2.2.2. The Cost Dimensions 
Having analyzed the benefits side, we now turn to the costs of adopting a shared 
network. We envision two kinds of opportunity costs. First, there is an opportunity cost of 
adoption for banks that have already deployed proprietary networks. These costs are likely 
to be proportional to Ni , but negatively related to N,, as reflected in the first element of 
Equation 6. Second, an opportunity cost may also develop out of per period revenue losses 
that the bank will incur if it does not participate in the network. This opportunity cost 
should be proportional to the per period value that bank customers place on their ability to  
access other banks' ATMs, which is expressed as the second element in Equation 6. 
A, and A, in this expression are parameters denoting the respective proportions, and N, - Ni 
is the resulting shared network size should the bank decide not to adopt the shared network 
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Thus, for banks that are small in terms of Ni relative to N,, the opportunity costs will be low. 
But, for banks that have deployed ATMs to a large number of locations, the opportunity 
costs will very be high, especially in markets where the network effects are significant. 
Overall, however, the opportunity cost for a bank declines over time. 
In addition to opportunity costs, there are other variable costs and fixed costs 
associated with network adoption. Assuming that each depositor makes the same number 
of transactions, the variable costs are proportional to the number of transactions. Without 
loss of generality, we can incorporate the variable costs in the parameters 1, and p,, or p2, 
depending on the type of transactions. 
The fixed costs may include the cost of making alterations to branches to 
accommodate ATMs, expenses related to adapting the bank's computer software to the 
ATMs, the cost of purchasing or leasing ATMs themselves, the cost of service and marketing 
(Saloner and Shepard, 1991). In the context of shared networks, the shared network 
organizations typically are responsible for marketing and promotional activities. Thus, the 
fined costs include hardware and software investments, membership fees, and terminal hook- 
up fees. The terminal hook-up fees are proportional to Ni, and thus can be incorporated 
into the parameter f,, without loss of generality. The hardware and software investment 
costs are usually too high for small banks to justify. With the help of third-party vendors 
who deliver outsourced electronic banking services, however, smaller banks are more likely 
to be able to derive the economic benefits of network participation. Again, without loss of 
generality, we can treat the hardware and software costs as part of the variable transaction 
costs. As a result, the fixed cost of adoption are minimal, which presumably is the one-time 
membership fee assessed at the time of adoption, denoted by G. 
2.23. Net Benefits and Decision Model 
Taking the elements of benefits (Equation 5) and costs (Equation 6 and GST) 
together, n~ in Equation 7 denotes the present value of bank i's net benefits of shared 
network adoption at time T. 
A bank earns greater benefits from adopting at time T than from waiting until time 
T+l  if VT > nT+,. Given that the potential adopting bank's decision depends on the flow 
of benefits and costs from adoption, bank i will adopt at time T if VT - n ~ + ~  in Equation 8 
is greater than 0. Thus, the smallest T that satisfies VT > n T + ~ ,  or equivalently, Equation 9, 
is the optimal time for bank i to adopt. 
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To simplify, we can assume that the fixed cost function, G, is constant over time. 
Thus, the right hand side in Equation 9 becomes Cr(l-6). With the help of third party 
processors, smaller banks can now have low investment costs and the same opportunity to 
adopt as the larger ones. The one-time membership fee is relatively low and almost fixed, 
and is in the range of a nominal fee to several thousand dollars, in general. Thus, Cr is not 
likely to be a dominant factor, and hence, we can leave out q ( l - 6 )  without loss of 
generality. As a result, the condition in Equation 9 reduces to Equation 10. 
Another assumption we make is that banks do not generate net revenues if the total 
number of others-on-us transactions equals us-on-others transactions, i.e., p,fl = p2f2 As 
described, fi and fi are parameters representing the interchange fee schedules. Because the 
interchange fee is mandated by the shared network organization, presumably it is the same 
for all network members. Thus, the assumption boils down to pl = p2 This is equivalent 
to saying that banks do not differ in the proportion of their card holders that will initiate 
interchange transactions, and all customers, irrespective of which services they use, act the 
same when they initiate interchange transactions. In other words, we assume that 
others-on-us customers react to the environment in the same way that us-on-others 
customers do. Although we recognize that many ATM value platform features, such as 
ATM location design choices, depth of ATM services, and environment features may shift 
the balance of interchange (Kauffman and Lally, 1993), and thus may affect the net 
interchange revenues, these variables are beyond the scope of our analytical model and 
empirical test. This assumption allows us to focus on the major variables of interest, and as 
a result, Equation 10 can be further reduced to Equation 11. 
The adoption decisions that are determined by Equation 11 are consistent with our 
assumption of equilibrium in the adoption of Yankee 24 membership in that given N ,  the 
adoption evolves according to the expected equilibrium adoption path. In other words, given 
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the equilibrium size of Yankee 24, N ,  for each period t, adding up the locations deployed 
by the adopters according to Equation 11 above sums up to the equilibrium size NT. For 
example, suppose NT.,=50 and NT=65. In period T-1, each banking firm adopts or fails to 
adopt according to Equation 11 (with the base value NT.,=58). In this case, we could have 
5 adopting banks each adding 3 locations for a total of 15 locations, yielding a new base of 
NT-,=65, which was the expected equilibrium level of the base in period T. We assume that 
the equilibrium adoption path was unique at a high level of participation, given the 
significant group of founding members of Yankee 24. 
23. Implications and Hypotheses 
Analytical Model Implications. The analytical framework developed in the previous section, 
Equation 11 in particular, yields several implications. First, the shared network installed 
base at  decision period T, NT, appears on the left hand side of Equation 11. It contributes 
to early adoption by a bank if nT grows with NT (i.e., the increase in NT is offset by that in 
nT) or if the network effect is strong. Second, the number of customers served per network 
location, nT/NT, leads to early adoption. This result is intuitive in the sense that nT/NT is a 
measure of network service coverage as perceived by bank i, and the larger the value of the 
ratio nT/NT, the greater the opportunity for the bank to earn interchange revenue. Note that 
the impact of nT, the total number of depositors of all member banks, is subtle because NT 
grows as it grows. However, it contributes to early adoption if we hold NT constant. Third, 
the number of a bank's depositors, ni, has an ambiguous impact on early adoption. 
However, it appears that the impact of ni is positive if the network effect is strong and the 
shared network installed base is much larger than the size of a bank's ATM network (i.e., 
NT > Ni). 
I 
Fourth, the overall effect of Ni, the size of a bank's ATM network, is also ambiguous. 
In particular, its impact depends, in part, on the network effect, i.e., the function b(N). If 
the network effect is strong, Ni is more likely to have a negative impact because of high 
opportunity costs. In general, however, banks which have deployed a small number of 
ATMs are very likely to adopt early, because they have very low opportunity costs relative 
to the potential benefits. On the other hand, although banks with large ATM networks have 
a better chance of earning more interchange revenues, they also have high opportunity costs, 
especially in the early stages of network growth in which network installed base is relatively 
small. In other words, banks which have deployed a larger number of ATMs may find it 
advantageous to wait for the shared network to grow to an extent to break even. As a 
result, they are likely to be later adopters. 
Generally speaking, the benefits grow and the opportunity costs of adoption decline 
over time. In other words, the left hand side in Equation 11 increases as the shared network 
continues to grow, which implies that every bank may eventually find it profitable to adopt 
the shared network. In cases when the market potential for the shared network is limited, 
however, banks with very large own ATM networks or a strong competitive position may 
never adopt. (Consider, for example, how long Citibank held up from participating in any 
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sharing agreement whatsoever; it was not until 1992 that Citibank decided to join the 
CIRRUS national shared electronic banking network.) 
Hypotheses. For the purpose of performing an empirical test to gauge the strength of 
network externalities and other key variables influencing the adoption of Yankee 24, we next 
discuss a series of hypotheses that follow directly from the analytical model presented above. 
The hypotheses employ the concept of "effective network size" in the local markets in which 
banks operate, recognizing the importance of network growth expected by potential adopters 
in their adoption decisions. Thus, our proxies for theoretical variables rely on an implicit 
hypothesis that network externalities are significant and measurable at the local market level. 
This enables us to test them using relevant data that adequately describe electronic banking 
network growth and banking firm competitive interactions in a realistic applied setting. Each 
of the hypotheses reflects a prediction about the conditions which lead to earlier adoption. 
H.1 Banks in markets that are expected to generate a larger network installed base 
have higher adoption probabilities. 
H.2 Banks in markets that have more card holders served per branch office have 
higher adoption probabilities. 
H.l applies the general assertion that firms which have the opportunity to adopt 
networked technologies will do so especially when the network is well established. Because 
differences in banks' post-adoption effective network size may be different depending on the 
local markets in which the banks operate, a shared network may generate different 
valuations for different banks. In other words, H.l suggests that the value of adopting a 
shared network would be higher for banks in markets expected to have a larger network 
installed base in equilibrium, all else equal. 
H.2 is an alternative to the hypothesis that the number of network card holders 
served per network ATM location has a positive impact on network valuation and the 
probability of adoption. The reason for having this alternative is that we cannot observe 
ATM placement, but we can observe branch placement from publicly available data. As we 
discussed earlier, banks in a market that has more customers served per branch office have 
lower customer service coverage and a greater opportunity to earn interchange revenue, and 
hence, higher adoption probabilities. Instead of adding costly new branches, those banks can 
also enhance their customer service coverage by joining shared electronic banking networks. 
For banks operating in the same local market, however, heterogeneity in banks' 
characteristics may play a role in determining the likelihood of earlier adoption, e.g., the 
number of ATM locations and the number of card holders. These observations suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
H.3 The larger the number of a bank's ATM locations, the lower the probability 
of adoption. 
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H.4 Banks with more card holders will register higher adoption probabilities. 
The effect of the size of a bank's ATM network on adoption probability is ambiguous 
in the analytical model, however, banks with small ATM networks are likely to adopt early, 
and banks with large ATM networks are likely to adopt later for reasons discussed earlier. 
In the presence of a strong network effect, the number of a bank's ATM locations will have 
a negative impact on adoption probabilities because of high opportunity costs. H.4 derives 
directly from our analytical model: the number of depositors has an unambiguous and 
positive impact on network value and hence on the probability of early adoption. 
Two additional variables, wage rate and market structure, have been shown to 
influence ATM adoption (Hannan and McDowell, 1984 & 1987; Saloner and Shepard, 1991). 
Although we do not incorporate them in our analytical model, we include them in our 
development of hypotheses and empirical test for control purposes. Mansfield (1968) and 
Romeo (1977) reported evidence supporting the hypothesis that the more competitive the 
market the greater rate of innovation diffusion. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) reviewed the 
empirical evidence and noted that diffusion does indeed tend to be faster in non- 
concentrated industries, i.e., diffusion should be faster the fewer firms there are in the region 
and the smaller the size inequalities between firms. Market structure and other industry 
characteristics have been hypothesized to influence innovation adoption and diffusion by 
many other studies, however, the results are inconclusive. Hannan and McDowell (1984) 
find that banks operating in concentrated markets were likely to adopt ATM technology 
earlier. H.5 follows the finding by Hannan and McDowell (1984). 
H.5 Banks that are located in more concentrated markets have a higher probability 
of adoption. 
Hannan and McDowell (1984) find support for their hypothesis that the higher the 
prevailing wage rate in the market in which the bank operates the more attractive the 
adoption of ATM to the bank. The findings by Saloner and Shepard (1991) also suggest 
that, consistent with the incentive for substituting ATMs for tellers, the wage rate contributes 
positively to early adoption. Because ATMs are labor saving, we expect this hypothesis, H.6, 
to hold for the adoption of shared electronic banking networks. 
H.6 The higher the wage rate in the market in which the bank operates the higher 
the probability of early adoption. 
3. MODELING APPROACH AND PRELIMINARIES 
In this section we provide an overview of the econometric analysis approach used ta 
investigate the impact of explanatory variables on the adoption probabilities. We also review 
studies of technology adoption that employed similar econometric techniques, as a means 
to contrast elements of our approach. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93-26 
3.1. Rationale for Using Hazard Model 
This study uses adoption data indicating the point in time that each of a large number 
of banking firms joined the shared electronic banking network. Thus, the statistical model 
to be employed should be able to assess the dependence of adoption time on explanatory 
variables, whose relationships are structured by our analytic model. In addition, because our 
observations of adoption times are ngItt-censored -- by the end of some observation period, 
some firms have adopted during the period of observation, while some firms may not have 
done so -- the estimation model must accommodate censoring. Hazard models developed 
in the statistics and econometrics literature, which attempt to assess the impact ofcovariates 
on the duration of an event, are readily applicable for the purpose of this study. Hazard 
models can explicitly incorporate covariates in the specification of time or probabilities to 
adopt, so that the population is heterogeneous in timing of adoption. As suggested by 
Mahajan, Muller, and Bass (1990), hazard models are particularly important in studying the 
innovation diffusion process. 
Note that hazard models are also known as duration models and failure time models. 
We use the term hazard models throughout this paper. Interested readers can refer to 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980) which offers a thorough discussion of the statistics of failure 
time data. Peterson (1991) describes the use of hazard rate models when analyzing event 
histories. Kiefer (1988) also provides a discussion of duration models in general. 
The impact of explanatory variables on the timing of adoption constitutes the hazard 
modeling tradition of innovation diffusion models at the individual level. Hannan and 
McDowell (1984) were the first to employ the hazard model to investigate the impact of 
covariates, mainly market structure and firm size, on the timing of adoption of ATMs. 
Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987), and Rose and Joskow (1990) applied similar techniques to 
study technology adoption. These studies have essentially explored the impact of market 
structure and the positive influence of firm size on the process of technology diffusion. 
3.2. Formulation of the Hazard Model 
To test the hypotheses derived from our analytical model and to gauge the strength 
of various variables on the probability of network adoption, the general strategy is to 
construct and estimate a hazard model, which assumes that the time until adoption for a 
banking firm is conditional on the explanatory variables and follows some distribution, the 
exponential or the Weibull distribution, for example. We next introduce the terminology and 
summarize the statistical mode1 used in the study. 
In this application, failure time denotes the elapsed time from the start of observation 
until the date on which the event of interest -- the adoption of shared electronic banking 
network -- occurs or the observation period ends. There are several ways to describe the 
distribution of observed failure times for an event: 
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(1) the cumulative failure time probability distributioiz fuizctio~z F(t) = Pr(T<t), 
which specifies the probability that the random variable T is less than some 
value t; 
(2) the corresponding probability derrsity function, f(t) = dF(t)/dt; 
(3) the survivorfinctwiz, S(t) = 1 - F(t) = Pr(Trt), defined as the probability that 
the firm will not have adopted the network by the end of period t; and 
(4) the Izazard functioiz, h(t) = f(t)/S(t). 
Although each of the four functions above can be used to derive the others, we 
choose to focus on the hazard function, which is a particularly convenient and useful 
function. Specifically, if T is a non-negative random variable representing the failure time 
of an individual banking firm from a population of n independent banking firms, the hazard 
function, hi(t), specifies the conditional probability that banking firm i will join the shared 
network at time t, given that it has not done so by t-1. 
Because the adoption time conditional on a firm's observable characteristics is 
assumed to be a random variable, we consider a subset of parametric hazard models, which 
embody specific assumptions about the distribution of failure time. The choice of an 
estimation model involves choosing a distribution for adoption dates. The exponential 
distrbutiorz is commonly used as a model for failure time data. With that distributional 
assumption, h(t) = y and S(t) = exp(-yt), where y > 0 (we use the notation exp( ) for 
convenience, for example, exp(-yt) is equivalent to e-7'). This model assumes a time 
invariant underlying hazard. using time va$ng explanatory variables in the model, however, 
the hazard rate can change as explanatory variables change over time. For example, 
Hannan and McDowell(1984) incorporated the effect of time varying covariates, Xi,, on the 
hazard function by writing h,(t) = y = exp(BXi,). In their expression, Xi, is a vector of 
observed explanatory variables relevant to period t adoption for firm i, and B is a column 
vector of unknown parameters that may be interpreted in terms of the relationship between 
explanatory variables and the conditional probability of adoption. As a result, the relative 
probabilities of adoption across firms change through time. 
The probability that banking firm i will adopt during a period Ti, prior to the end of 
the study period, can be shown to be Si(Ti.J - S,(Ti). Hence, the likelihood of adoption is 
also a function of the explanatory variables prevailing in each period up to the end of the 
study period or the time of adoption, whichever comes first. The estimation procedure will 
yield parameter estimates for 13 that maximize a likelihood function composed of the above 
probabilities. The likelihood function is expressed in Equation 12. 
In this expression, T' is the end of observation period, and n, and n2 denote the number of 
firms that adopted by T', and did not adopt by T', respectivejy . 
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An alternative approach is to allow the hazard rate to be a function of time directly. 
We employ the Weibull dktriburion, a functional form that has been widely used in modeling 
technology diffusion (e.g., Rose and Joskow, 1990 and Saloner and Shepard, 1991). With 
the assumption of this functional form, h(t) = yata-I and S(t) = exp(-yta) (y > 0 and a > 
0). Note that the Weibull distribution is a simple generalization of the exponential 
distribution, which is obtained by setting a = 1. The effect of explanatory variables on the 
hazard function can be also incorporated by letting y = exp(-SXi), a standard assumption 
(Saloner and Shepard, 1991). Xi is a vector of fixed explanatory variables for firm i, and S 
is a column vector of unknown coefficients. One of the attractive features of the Weibull 
distribution is that the computation of the effects of the covariates on adoption probabilities 
from parameter estimates is relatively simple. Here the covariates are assumed to be 
constant throughout the observation period. 
Other functional forms include the ~zormal dktributio~t and logktic dktribution. 
Because the choice of a particular parameterization depends, in part, on empirical 
considerations (Sinha and Chandrashekaran, 1992), we estimate several hazard models with 
different distributions to justify the specific choice for this study empirically. 
4. MEASURES AND DATA COLLECTION 
We briefly describe the diffusion of Yankee 24, and the measures and data set used 
to examine the impact of various variables influencing Yankee 24 membership. 
4.1. Yankee 24 
New England Network Inc. is the Connecticut-based owner of Yankee 24, which was 
officially organized in August 1983 by nine banks in Connecticut. The network organization 
was then called Connecticut Switch Inc., and it was owned by the founders. In July 1984, 
the network went into operation, and began to seek other banking firm members. Because 
regulatory policies toward shared ATM networks in Connecticut at the time ruled that ATM 
sharing was malzdatoy, membership was open to all depository institutions in Connecticut 
and all members shared the ownership of the non-profit network organization. Potential 
entrants could, thus, become actual members by requesting to join Yankee 24. Out-of-state 
banks, however, were prohibited from establishing or using ATMs within the state at that 
time. Each participating bank paid a one-time membership fee of $5,000, a terminal hook- 
up fee of $300 per ATM, and an ongoing monthly fee of $35 per ATM. Services offered 
by the network included withdrawal, deposits, transfers, and cash advances. For each 
interchange transaction, an interchange fee set by Yankee 24 was paid to the owner of an 
ATM by a network member whenever that member's card holders used an ATM. 
In 1985, Yankee 24 became the largest shared electronic banking network in New 
England in terms of number of ATMs shared and interbank ATM transactions. By 1987, 
Yankee 24 had over 700 ATMs, and a great majority of banks in Connecticut had joined 
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Yankee 24. Arosnd that time, banking firms in other New England states were allowed to 
join the shared ~etwork organization, and the network's marketing staff began to actively 
solicit new members in those states, based on prior approval by the network's board of 
directors. By April 1991, Yankee 24 had grown to be the dominant shared electronic 
banking network in New England. Today, it has more than 700 network members and some 
4,000 ATMs accessible to all members' ATM card holders, including 223 members in 
Connecticut with 1306 ATMs. 
The founding members of Yankee 24 basically achieved a minimum viable scale that 
deterred further entry into Connecticut. Thus, for every bank a local market, the decision 
was whether to join the statewide network. When Yankee 24 entered the Massachusetts 
market in 1987, its largest competitor was BayBanks, particularly in the Boston area. The 
other competing network was the New York Cash Exchange (NYCE), owned by a 
consortium of many New York City banks around mid 1970s. However, it was not until mid- 
1987 that NYCE began to establish a significant presence outside its New York home 
market. Thus, competition from other networks was not an important factor in Connecticut 
prior to 1987. 
4.2. Scope of Study and Description of Measures 
'17ze Scope of Study and Rationale. For the reasons discussed below, the scope of the 
empirical study is restricted to Connecticut-based banks. First, banking firms in other New 
England states were allowed to join the shared network organization only after the second 
quarter of 1987, and a great majority of Connecticut-based banking firms had signed up with 
Yankee 24 by that time. Therefore, the network installed base and the number of network 
card holders was large enough such that many banks would obtain positive net benefits from 
adoption once Yankee 24 opened up to them. As a resuit, the variables of interest in this 
study may not be able to explain Yankee 24 outside of Connecticut due to differences in 
state environments. 
Second, because larger banks with more card holders and ATMs were more valuable 
to the shared network organization, it is likely that there were member solicitation and 
coalition formation activities prior to the date Yankee 24 was officially opened to all banking 
firms in other New England states. Third, there was no competition in Connecticut in the 
time frame of our study, whereas outside of the state, several competing networks began to 
operate (e.g., BayBanks and NYCE). The presence of those competing networks would 
require us to model the perceived business value of network membership differently. 
Thus, to focus on the variables of interest, we limit our sample to include only 
Connecticut-based banks. The sample was further restricted to commercial banks and 
savings banks because of two reasons: (1) credit unions are very different organizations from 
savings and commercial banks; and (2) savings and loans are not under the supervision of 
Federal Reserve Bank, and hence their data are difficult to get. 
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DeJinition of Variabks. In the hazard model we employ, the time to adoption is grouped into 
quarterly intervals. T is set to 1 for banks that joined Yankee 24 by the end of the fourth 
quarter of 1984, and the value of T for each other bank is determined by the elapsed time 
in quarters until adoption. Banks that had not joined Yankee 24 by the end of the first 
quarter of 1987 are right-censored with a T value of 10. 
Following the market research tradition in the banking industry, we break Connecticut 
into 18 banking markets where Yankee 24 is offered. A market is either a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) or a county that has been judged to approximate a 
local banking market. Explanatory variables of network adoption and the measures used 
in this study are: 
NETWORK BASE: A weighted average of market bank branches, a proxy for the 
unobse rvab~~  expected size of the network installed base in the local banking 
markets. Because data on the number of ATM locations are not available, we use 
the number of bank branches as a proxy; branch offices are the most common and 
lowest cost locations for ATMs (Saloner and Shepard, 1991). For banks that have 
branch offices covering more than one market, a weighted average is used. Because 
banks in markets that are expected to have a larger network installed base are likely 
to adopt early, we expect that large values of NETWORKBASE will have a positive 
impact on the hazard rate. 
2. SERVICE-COV: The number of residents per branch office in the local market, 
which is a proxy for the number of card holders per branch. We expect that the 
lower the level of service coverage (the higher the value for SERVICE - COV), the 
higher the adoption probability. 
3. BRANCH: The total number of branch offices operated by a bank. This is a proxy 
for the size of a bank's ATM network, for which data were not available for non- 
Yankee 24 members. This variable contributes to the opportunity costs of joining 
Yankee 24 as discussed in Section 2. 
4. LOG DEPOSIT: The log of total demand deposits, a proxy for the number of bank 
card holders, for which data is not available. The logarithm is used because the 
distribution of deposits is skewed. 
5. CR4: market concentration, measured as the proportion of total market deposits 
accounted for by the largest four banking firms in the local market. 
6. SALARY-EMP: Salary expenses per employee, defined as salary expenses and 
employee benefits over full-time equivalent employees. This a proxy for wage rate. 
For control purposes, we also include BHC, a dummy indicating ownership of a bank 
by a bank holding company. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the hazard model 
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appear in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
NETWORK BASE 108.72 68.91 
SERVICE CV 2880.50 642.79 
BRANCH- 11.17 24.62 
LOG-DEPOSIT 8.43 2.16 
CR4 37.21 11.92 
SALARY-EMP 10.17 1.54 
43. Data Sources 
To determine the impact of the explanatory variables on network adoption in the 
Yankee 24, we put together a data set that includes network adoption dates, bank 
characteristics and local market structure variables. Membership adoption data were 
obtained from New England Network Inc. Local banking market and population data were 
obtained from the statistics presented in the 1980 U.S. Census of Population. 
Banking firm characteristics were obtained from periodic reports, including the 
Report of Condition and Income (referred to in the banking industry as a "call report") and 
the Summary of Deposits (SUMD) maintained by the Federal Reserve Board. The call and 
SUMD reports detailed balance sheet and other summary information on banks, which 
provided the basis for some of the explanatory variables. Additional information related to 
bank branches and locations was obtained from Polk's Bank Directory (1987). 
A list of commercial banks and a list of savings banks that operated in Connecticut 
were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, respectively. These two lists were combined for a total of 104 Connecticut- 
based commercial banks and savings banks, which define the universe of commercial banks 
and savings banks in Connectic~t.~ However, only 85 out of those 104 were found to have 
filed call and SUMD reports with the Federal Reserve Board in June 1984. Thus, 19 
banking firms were eliminated from the sample, presumably because of bankruptcy, merger 
and consolidation, or missing data during the sample period. To focus on the adoption and 
diffusion of Yankee 24 after it was established, we excluded the founding members from the 
estimation of hazard model, yielding a final sample of 78 banking firms. 
l ~ h i s  number is very realistic. As of June 1987, there were a total of 120 commercial 
and savings bank in Connecticut reported by Polk's Bank Directory. 
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Of the 78 banking firms in the sample, 61 had adopted by the second quarter of 1987, 
an adoption rate of 78%. Table 2 presents a sample frequency distribution of the Yankee 
24 network members by bank type. + 
Table 2. Sample Distribution by Bank Type 
Bank Type Yankee 24 Non-Yankee 24 Total 
Commercial Banks 22 
Savings Banks 39 
Total 6 1 
5. RESULTS AhTD DISCUSSION 
This section summarizes the results and major findings of the hazard model 
estimations. In particular, we present the empirical evidence for network externalities on 
Yankee 24 adoption. In our model of perceived network business value, the adoption 
benefits grow and the opportunity costs of adoption decline over time, which implies that 
every bank may eventually find it profitable to adopt the shared network. Thus, our 
empirical model focuses on wlzeiz Connecticut-based banks would adopt Yankee 24, instead 
of whether they would adopt. 
TO test the hypotheses derived from our analytical model and to gauge the strength 
of various variables on the probability of network adoption, we estimated four hazard 
models, with exponential, Weibull, normal, and logistic distributional forms, respectively, 
using Yankee 24 adoption data. Econometric estimation of the hazard function model was 
performed using LIMDEP 6.0, an econometric package developed by Greene (1992). The 
Weibull model performed better than the other three via maximum likelihood estimation in 
terms of log-likelihoods, although not statistically significant with likelihood ratio tests. As 
a matter of fact, all four models yielded qualitatively similar results -- the estimation results 
from all four models were very close in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients. 
Although the parameter estimations were found to be relatively robust across various 
assumptions of distributional functional forms with our data set, we report the results based 
on Weibull hazard model estimation in this study. 
The parameter estimates and the significance level are shown in Table 3. The 
coefficients for BRANCH and CR4 variables are positive, and those for LOG-DEPOSIT, 
SALARY-EMP, SERVICE-COV, NETWORK-BASE, and BHC are negative. A1 
coefficients, except the one for CR4, are significant at the 5 percent level. 
The hazard function is increasing in time with a > 1, which suggests a hazard rate 
that is generally increasing over time. In other words, the probability of adoption for banks 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Weibull Hazard Model 











with mean values on explanatory variables increases over time, given that they have not 
adopted the shared network. This result is consistent w'th the prediction by the analytical 
model. Our analytical model indicates that the benefits of network adoption grow and the 
opportunity cost.of adoption declines over time. Thus, as the network grows, the value of 
the shared network increases, and it may be that over time an increasing percentage of those 
who haven't adopted the shared network finds it profitable to do so. 
The variable NETWORK-BASE has a significant and negative coefficient, which 
implies that the hazard rate is an increasing function of the expected network installed base, 
a proxy for the extent of network externalities. This confirms our hypothesis that banks in 
2 ~ i v e n  our formulation of the Weibull model, a positive coefficient implies a negative 
impact on the hazard and therefore a positive impact on the mean time to adoption. 
Elsewhere, the interpretation of the sign of parameters and variable coefficients may be 
different. 
20 
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markets that are  expected to generate greater extent of network externalities have higher 
adoption probabilities. In other words, because differences in banks' post-adoption effective 
network size may be different depending on the local markets in which the banks operate, 
banks in markets expected to have larger network installed base value highly the shared 
network. Note that although this result is consistent with our analytical model, which 
indicates that the shared network installed base in general contributes to  early adoption, the 
empirical result implies that the impact of network installed base may be in the local 
markets. In other words, our finding suggests the importance of the concept of expected 
effective shared network size, which lies in the local market in which a bank operates. 
T h e  variable measuring customer service coverage. SERVICE-COV, has a significant 
and negative coefficient, which shows that banks in markets that have more customers served 
per bank branch have higher adoption probabilities. Thus, the lower the level of network 
service coverage in the market as perceived by the bank, the earlier the adoption. The 
result can be  interpreted as follows: banks in the markers that have more customers served 
per AThd have a better chance to earn interchange revenues. The empirical result indicates 
that the impact of service coverage for a bank is in the local market in which the bank 
competes. Although this corresponds with our assumption that the local market is 
important, it does not rule out the possibility that some benefits, which a re  very difficult to  
measure, a re  enjoyed across the markets. In that case, the network ex?ernalities would be 
underestimated. 
The  positive coefficient for BRANCH indicates that the more branch offices a bank 
operates, the more likely the bank will wait longer until adoption. Because BRANCH is a 
proxy for the size of a bank's ATM network, it suggests that the smaller the size of a bank 
in terms of its branch network, the higher the probability of adoption, given that the bank 
has not yet done so. Alternatively, banks with large own branch networks are not willing to 
join the shared network early and share their facilities with other members. Thus, the result 
is contrary to  the finding by Saioner and Shepard (1991), and clearly distinguishes the effect 
of network externalities from the proprietary network effect. Our analytical model suggests 
that the effect of the size of a bank's ATM network depends, in part, on  the network effect. 
If the network effect is strong, a negative impact is more likely because of high opportunity 
costs. Thus, the result can also be interpreted as evidence of strong network effect and that 
banks with large ATM networks waited longer for the shared network to grow to a break 
even point. 
With a negative estimated coefficient, LOG DEPOSIT registers a positive impact on 
the adoption probability. The result is consistent with that reported by Saloner and Shepard 
(1991): a bank's date of adoption is earlier the larger the value of its deposit base. Because 
total demand deposits proxy for the number of a bank's customers, the result indicates that 
banks with more customers are more likely to  join shared networks early. Presumably, the 
benefits of network membership for them are greater. As discussed earlier, the reasons can 
be that the network effect is strong o r  that the initial (start-up) shared network installed base 
is much larger than the size of most bank's ATM networks. 
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The coefficient for CR4 is insignificant although positive. Hence, in the contex?. of 
shared network, we did not find support for the finding reported by Hannan and McDowell 
(1984) that banks operating in concentrated markets were likely to  adopt earlier. The 
coefficient for SALARY-EMF is negative, indicating that the salary expenses per employee 
paid by a bank have a positive impact on the adoption probability. This result confirms our 
hypothesis that shared networks are labor-saving, and that shared network membership can 
substitute for labor expenses. A negative coefficient was obtained for BHC, indicating that 
ownership by a bank holdjng company leads to early adoption. 
6. COh'CLUSlONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section presents the conclusions of this research, followed by its limitations and 
possible extensions for future research. 
6.1. Conclusions 
This paper  goes beyond the widely applied classical diffusion model which stresses 
the innovativeness of potential adopters with an assumption that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to  adopt. We examine instead the attributes of technology, organization and 
market as well as network exzernalities that channel shared network technologies to potential 
adopters. 
The  analytical model incorporates major variables that are likely to  affect the net 
benefits of adoption. It can be used to assess the impact of network externalities or other 
important variables on  the perceived business values of adoption analytically. In particular, 
it can be used to  develop realistic study hypotheses that can be tested with real data and 
available statistical tools, and guide the empirical analysis. Although some of our variables 
in our analytical model do  not have an unambiguous impact on the perceived network 
business value, we view that as a positive aspect because in its general form we can 
investigate the various conditions under which perceived network value varies. 
The empirical results tend to support the hypotheses derived from the analytical 
model. We find that banks in markets that are expected to  have larger shared network 
installed base have higher adoption probabilities. We also find that banks in markets that 
have more customers served per branch office (lower in the level of branch service coverage, 
or higher in unfulfilled demand for service coverage) tend to  join shared network earlier. 
Thus, we conclude that, all else equal, banks in markets that can generate larger network 
ea~ernalities and higher network value have higher probabilities of adopting a shared 
network. In terms of bank characteristics, we find that the size of branch network a bank 
operates decreases the probability of early shared network adoption. In addition, a bank 
adopts sooner, the larger the value of its deposits. The  salary expenses per employee paid 
by a bank increase the adoption probability, indicating that shared networks are  labor saving. 
Ownership structure by a bank holding company may exert some influence on  the adoption 
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decision. 
This paper is one of the few attempts to assess the impact of network externalities 
on the perceived business value of the network, and thus on the timing of adoption. We find 
evidence to  support the assertion that network externalities are a determinant of shared 
network adoption. The results also suggest the importance of the concept of expected 
effective network size as a measure of network externalities. Network owners can look into 
the local markets for potential adopting firms and identify the effective network size that is 
likely to  affect the perceived network business value and adoption decisions. Investigation 
of the conditions under which early adoption is encouraged will also be very fruitful. Finding 
answers to  important questions such as what are the factors likely to lead to early adoption 
by large banks, and in what stages of network growth, is also possible with the approach 
used in this study. 
Banking firms contemplating shared network adoption can estimate the present value 
of the net benefits of network adoption as a basis for adoption decision. In addition, by 
examining their own characteristics, the shared network growth data, and the various 
parameters o r  features influencing the flow of benefits and costs, banks are able to assess 
the impact of those variables on the business value of the shared network so as to obtain 
positive flow of net benefits. 
6.2. Future Research 
Some of the variables in our analytical model do  not yield an unambiguous impact 
on the perceived network business value. We can investigate the various conditions under 
which perceived network value will increase using the general analytical model. The  
interactions behveen major variables can be further examined and analyzed. Other variables 
influencing the perceived network business value, e.g, wage rate and features affecting the 
ATM value platform, can also be incorporated in the analytical model and tested with real 
data. 
Although the context of this study is shared electronic banking networks, the empirical 
results of this study have implications for other IOSs, such as electronic data interchange 
(EDI), SWIFT, nationally shared electronic funds transfer networks, and credit card 
switching. The  analytical framework can be modified to  study the adoption of other shared 
networks or  further ex.tended to model the adoption of competing networks. The  approach 
in this study can also be applied to study the adoption of non-network products or  
technology standards that have significant network externalities, such as computer operating 
systems (OS/2, UNIX, and MS-DOS), computer architecture design (RISC and SISC), 
software engineering tools, and video standards (VHS versus Beta). 
Several shortcomings and limitations of this study should be acknowledged. Although 
network externalities have been suggested in the theoretical network literature to impact 
technology adoption, there has been very little attempt to  operationalize network 
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ex~ernalities. The extent of network externalities is often characterized as the size of 
network installed base. A direct estimation of network adoption with installed base as an 
explanatory variable, however, may cause serious interpretational problems. As pointed out 
by Cabral (1990), the adoption path may be discontinuous (have a catastrophe point) if 
network externalities are strong. If a large number of potential adopters choose to adopt 
within the same obsen~ation period, we may observe a negative relationship between the 
installed base (extent of network externalities) and current adoptions. Therefore, we 
employed several firm and market specific characteristics, which are  likely to enhance the 
business value of shared network as observable proxies for network externalities. 
This study may be limited in the sense that several other factors that may potentially 
affect adoption decisions, such as marketing mix variables, decision making structure 
variables and supply side characteristics, were not present in the data set. Also, we only 
consider Connecticut-based banks in this study. Separate analysis and model estimation for 
banks in other New England states can be undertaken in the future. 
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